Assignment # 36: Explore the pre-requisites for galvanic prose. Dr.Sohail Ansari

Socrates asks Euthyphro the now philosophically famous question that he and any divine command theorist must consider: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”

A person can never be loved by God if he is not pious.

One might argue that if the motive for being moral on Divine Command Theory is to merely avoid punishment and perhaps gain eternal bliss, then this is less than ideal as an account of moral motivation, because it is a mark of moral immaturity. Should we not instead seek to live moral lives in community with others because we value them and desire their happiness?

 We never do a job for the job sake nor we learn for learning sake; things are always means to an end for us. Valuing others means to be valued by God.

موثر ادب کی شرائط

ڈاکٹر شاہ رشاد عثمانی

galvanic prose

موثر ادب کی شرائط :مختصر یہ ہے کہ اسلامی تحریک جو دنیا کی دوسری تحریکوں کے مقابلے میں انسانی فطرت سے سب سے زیادہ قریب ہے،وہ کبھی بھی ادب کی خدمت سے محرومی  کی نادانی کا مظاہرہ نہیں کرسکتی۔ چنانچہ تحریک ادب اسلامی کی ضرورت و اہمیت کے سلسلے میں مولانا سیّد ابوالاعلیٰ مودودیؒ کی ایک تقریر کا حصہ پیش خدمت ہے،جو انھوں نے حلقہ ادب اسلامی لاہور کے اجلاس (۱۱ جولائی ۱۹۵۲ء) میں کی تھی۔ یہ تقریر وابستگانِ تحریک ِ اسلامی کے لیے ایک واضح نشانِ راہ ہے۔ مولانا مرحوم فرماتے ہیں :
اسلامی ادب صرف اس ادب کا نام نہیں جو گندگی سے پاک ہو، غیرنجس ہو اور صاف ستھرا ہو، بلکہ اسلامی ادب وہ ہے جو اسلام کے نظریے پر مبنی ہو۔ جن باتوں کو اسلام حق کہتا ہے، مسلم ادیب انھیں حق سمجھے او دوسروں پر ظاہر کرے اور انھیں منوائے۔ جو باتیں اسلام کے نزدیک باطل ہیں، مسلمان ادیب انھیں جھوٹ سمجھے، ان کے جھوٹ ہونے کا اظہار کرے اور انھیں جھوٹ ثابت کرے۔ اسلام جس نظامِ زندگی کو قائم کرنا چاہتا ہے، مسلم ادیب اس کے لیے ادب کے دائرۂ عمل میں سعی کرے۔
علمی لٹریچر کا مقصد ذہنوں کو تیار کرنا ہوتا ہے لیکن ادب دلوں کو مسخر کرکے انھیں حرکت پر آمادہ کرتا ہے، اس لیے ادب کو مؤثر ہونا چاہیے۔ اگر وہ قلوب کو متاثر نہیں کرتا اور ان میں جوش و ولولہ بھر کر انسانوں کو آمادۂ حرکت نہیں کرتا تو وہ بے روح اور بے جان ادب ہے۔
ادب کو مؤثر بنانے کے لیے سات چیزوں کی ضرورت ہے:
    ٭      ادب کو مؤثر بنانے والی پہلی چیز یہ ہے کہ ادب میں ابتذال [platitude] نہ ہو۔ مسلم ادیب اپنے آپ کو مبتذل [vulgar] اور پامال راہوں سے بچاتے رہیں۔ مسلم ادیب میں اُپچ ہونی چاہیے، اس کا ذہن نئی راہیں نکال سکتا ہو۔ جو ادیب پٹی ہوئی راہوں پر چلتے ہیں، وہ لوگوں کو بہت جلد تھکا دیتے ہیں۔
    ٭      دوسری چیز یہ ہے کہ ادیب کی زبان عام فہم ہو۔ وہ گنجلک زبان اور ایسے الفاظ استعمال نہ کرے، جن سے ذہن آشنا نہ ہو۔ یہ کمزوری ان ادیبوں میں ہوتی ہے، جو غیر زبان میں پڑھتے اور سوچتے ہیں اور اپنی زبان میں ترجمہ کرتے ہیں۔ لیکن مناسب الفاظ نہ پاکر انھیں گھڑتے ہیں۔ ایسے ادیبوں سے لوگوں کے ذہن مانوس نہیں ہوتے اور وہ ایک اجنبیت سی محسوس کرتے ہیں۔
    ٭      تیسری چیز پختگی فکر ہے۔ مسلم ادیب کو اَدھ کچرے خیال ظاہر نہیں کرنے چاہییں، بلکہ انھیں اپنی فکر خوب اچھی طرح سلجھا لینی چاہیے۔ سلجھی ہوئی فکر، زبان اور اسلوبِ بیان میں کسی قسم کی پیچیدگی پیدا نہیں ہونے دیتی۔
    ٭      چوتھی چیز یہ ہے کہ ادیب کی معلومات وسیع ہوں۔ اس کے بغیر ادیب نہ تو کوئی کام کی بات کہہ سکتا ہے، نہ دوسرے لوگوں پر اثرڈال سکتا ہے۔ اس کا سینہ اتھلے کنوئیں کی طرح ہوتا ہے جس کا ذخیرہ بہت جلد ختم ہوجاتا ہے۔ادیب کی معلومات جس قدر وسیع ہوں گی،اتنی ہی مؤثر بات وہ کہہ سکے گا۔ اس لیے اسلامی ادیبوں کو تاریخ، فلسفے وغیرہ کا گہرا مطالعہ کرنا چاہیے۔
    ٭       پانچویں ضروری چیز ادیب کی قوتِ استدلال ہے۔ جس طرح علمی مضامین میں استدلال سے کام لینا پڑتا ہے، اسی طرح ایک ادیب اور ایک شاعر کو بھی استدلال کی ضرورت پڑتی ہے۔ لیکن ادیب اور شاعر کا اندازِ استدلال منطقی ہونے کے بجاے شیریں اور دل کش ہوتا ہے۔ اس استدلال ہی سے وہ قاری سے اپنی بات منوا لیا کرتا ہے۔ استدلال کے بغیر ادب مؤثر نہیں ہوتا۔
    ٭       چھٹی چیز یہ ہے کہ ادیب میں خلوص ہو۔ جو ادیب مخلص ہوتا ہے، اُس کے الفاظ اُس کے احساسات اور خیالات کے عین مطابق ہوتے ہیں۔اگر وہ اپنے احساسات کے خلاف کہنا بھی چاہے تو اس کی زبان اور قلم اُس کا ساتھ نہیں دیتے۔ مسلم ادیب حقیقی جذبات اور احساسات کے مطابق زبان اور قلم سے کام لیتا ہے جس سے اس میں بے پناہ طاقت پیدا ہوجاتی ہے۔
    ٭       ساتویں چیز یہ ہے کہ ادیب کی زندگی اس کے خیالات کے مطابق ہو۔ جو لوگ کہتے کچھ اور کرتے کچھ ہیں، میرے نزدیک ان سے زیادہ فضول آدمی کوئی نہیں۔ ایسے لوگوں نے دُنیا میں کوئی کام نہیں کیا۔ سیرت و کردار ہی بیان اور قلم میں زور پیدا کرتا ہے۔ کردار سے خالی گفتار بے اثر چیز ہے۔ کوئی اسلامی ادیب اس ابوالفضولی میں مبتلا نہیں ہوسکتا۔(سیّد ابوالاعلیٰ مودودی، تصریحات، ص ۵۹-۶۱)

٭ عہد حاضر کے ادبی تقاضے :مولانا مودودی کا یہ فکر انگیز بیان نہ صرف موجودہ حالات میں شعرو ادب کی اہمیت پر دلالت کرتا ہے، بلکہ اس حقیقت کا اظہار بھی ہے کہ اگر ہم اب بھی اس طرف متوجہ نہ ہوں گے تو ابلاغ عامّہ کے جدیدوسائل ریڈیو،ٹیلی وژن اور اخبارات ورسائل پر باطل پرستوں کانہ صرف قبضہ برقرار رہے گا، بلکہ وہ اپنے ڈراموں ،نغموں ،حتیٰ کہ خبروں اور   ان پر تبصروں کے ذریعے اسلام دشمنی، الحادوبے دینی اور عریانی وفحاشی کے فروغ میں کوشاں رہیں گے اور ہم ان کا کوئی توڑ نہ کرسکیں گے۔ لہٰذا، اب بھی موقع ہے کہ ہم اپنے ادبی محاذکی اہمیت سمجھیں اور نہ صرف اُسے اپنا ہر طرح کا تعاون پیش کریں بلکہ ہمارے اہل فکروفن نوجوان اس میدانِ علم و دانش میں قدم رکھیں اور تمام اصنافِ ادب میں اسلامی اقدار کے فروغ کے لیے نئی نئی راہیں تلاش کریں۔
تحریک ادب اسلامی سے وابستہ قلم کاروں کو ایک بار پھر اپنے عہد کے ادبی و تحریکی تقاضوں کو پورا کرنے کے لیے برسرِپیکار ہوناہے۔انھیں اُسی خلوص،جذبے اور نیّت سے قلم اُٹھانا ہے، جس نیت سے وہ مسجد میں نماز کے لیے، یا میدان میں جہاد کے لیے داخل ہوتے ہیں، کیوںکہ ان کا ادب عبادت کے لیے وقف ہے۔
اسی کے ساتھ دوسری اہم چیز’فن‘ ہے۔ادب میں فن کی کمزوری خلوصِ نیت اور جذبۂ نمود سے بے نیازی کا بدل نہیں بن سکتی۔ ہماری فنّی کو تاہیاں، مقصد و نصب العین کی خدمت کے بجاے اس کا وزن کم کر نے کا موجب ہوسکتی ہیں۔ ہمیں یہ دیکھنا ہوگا کہ کن کن الفاظ کا استعمال کس کس جگہ مفید ہے کہ جس سے ہم اپنا راستہ نکال سکیں ۔الفاظ، ادیب کے لیے آلات کار ہیں۔ ان آلات کا مناسب اور بر محل استعمال ہی ایک سپاہی کو میدان جنگ میں کامران کرتا ہے۔ لہٰذا، موجودہ معاشرے کو رائج الوقت الحادی اور لادینی ادب کے پنجے سے نکال کر اپنے تحت لانے کے لیے ہمیں شدید محنت اور فنّی ریاض کرنا ہوگا۔
اس سلسلے کی تیسری اہم ترین چیز مطالعے کی وسعت ہے۔ موجودہ ادب اور اس کے سرچشمے کو اچھی طرح جانے بغیر ان پرغلبہ حاصل نہیں ہو سکتا۔ اس کے لیے ماضی و حال کے تمام ادب، مختلف مادّی افکار ونظریات اور عقائدومذاہب کا تنقیدی وتقابلی مطالعہ ضروری ہے۔ اس سے فن میں گہرائی وگیرائی پیدا ہوتی ہے، ادبی رسوخ بڑھتا ہے، تخلیق کو عمر دوام نصیب ہوتی ہے ۔
چوتھی چیزجو ہمیشہ دل ودماغ میں تازہ رکھنے کی ہے ،وہ یہ کہ ہمیں بہرحال ایک نصب العین کی خدمت کرنی ہے اور ایک مقصد کو فروغ دینا ہے ۔چنانچہ اگر ہماری کوئی ایسی چیز میدانِ ادب میں آئے کہ جو اس نصب العین کو تقویت کے بجاے اس کی تذلیل اور سبکی کا باعث ہو، تو یہ خود اس نصب العین کو نقصان پہنچانے کا باعث ہوگا۔ لہٰذا، یہ کوشش بھی ہونی چاہیے کہ ہمارے ادبی محاذ پر کوئی ایسی چیز نہ آنے پائے جو اجتماعی نصب العین کو نقصان پہنچانے والی ہو ۔
 آخری بات یہ ہے کہ ادب میں الحاد وبے دینی کے غلبے اور فحاشی وبے حیائی کے سیلاب کو روکنے کے لیے منظّم جدّوجہد کا عزم اسلامی فنکاروں اور ادیبوں کا فرض ہے۔ہمارا کام یہ ہے کہ اس محاذ پر اپنی قوتوں کو ترقی دیتے ہوئے منظم کریں۔ جس محاذ پر جاہلیت کے کارندوں نے جاہلی ادب کے پہاڑ کھڑے کر رکھے ہیں، وہاں ہم حقائق کے پیکر تراش کر سامنے لائیں اور اس طرح اپنی اجتماعی کوششوں کے ذریعے ایک ایسی تحریک کا آغاز کریں، جس سے ادبی جاہلیت کا غلبہ ختم ہو، اور انسانی فطرت کے صحیح رجحانات کی حفاظت اور نشوونما ہو۔

Aesthetic theory & Aesthetics

Baumgarten introduced the term “aesthetics” as denoting the fundamental cognitive task of knowing things through the senses (Beiser, 2011). Nevertheless, according to Beardsley (1969; 4), who is considered as one of the most important late 20th-century aestheticians, “Whatever its origin, this concept undoubtedly achieved its fullest development and its richest application in the aesthetic theory of John Dewey.” According to Dewey (1980, p. 16) the experience of “the aesthetic” involves a “drama in which action, feeling, and meaning are one.”

Excercise

What kind of effects writings can produce if feelings are divorced from meanings and actions are devoid of meanings?

For Dewey (1980, p. 19) “experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ. Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful perception which is aesthetic experience.”

Exercise

How a person can know he has the art in germ and how he can develop it?

Dewey, then, argues that art and aesthetic experience are not limited to the usual artistic objects but extend to all expressions of life.

If one accepts that there are no aesthetic objects per se, then an object is considered aesthetic with respect to the interaction context in which it is perceived. Also, since “the aesthetic” cannot be found in the object, those objects that are nowadays widely considered aesthetic per se did not pre-exist but the interactions with them have developed to the point that we now consider these objects as such.

Excercise

The aesthetic elements in the writings of Muslim scholars may not be considered aesthetic with respect to the interaction context of the west. Do you agree if so suggest something so that writings can exist as aesthetic per se

In other words, there is no such thing as an aesthetic object per se, but it is a particular interaction that might have an aesthetic dimension or not. As Dewey (1980, p. 12) said, “the answers cannot be found, unless we are willing to find the germs and roots in matters of experience that we do not currently regard as aesthetic.” Hence, we are interested in those “aesthetic” interactions and particularly in the type that fosters the emergence of feelings that promote the construction of a potential preference in everyday objects or state of affairs, and which cannot be dealt with in the triptych of transcendental, objective, and art-centered aesthetics.

A picture or relief carving on three panels, typically hinged together vertically and used as an altarpiece.

"A triptych depicting the Crucifixion"

·         A set of three associated artistic, literary, or musical works intended to be appreciated together.

"A triptych on the theme of the holocaust"

In this sense, there are several everyday cases of interaction that most aestheticians do not regard as “aesthetic” but in our view involve feelings of a potential preference on the basis of which the “germs and roots” of aesthetics are developed. These cases clearly illustrate that “the aesthetic” is not a feature of the object. For instance, some people feel they can be very productive when they find themselves in chaotic workplaces (e.g., Francis Bacon in his art studio), while others feel they are completely unable to accomplish any task in such interactive (working) contexts. A car that the designer expects to cause a tremendous thrill is perceived differently in Western civilization and by indigenous people. In each of these cases feelings may influence a potential preference that may in turn become a judgment; or, for whatever reason, these feelings can be modified during interaction. For example, users may expect using a high-tech coffee machine to be the best way to prepare a coffee, but they can change their mind during the procedure. Someone could start feeling anxious and uncomfortable during a film after having decided to watch it on the basis of positive critiques from prior viewers who enjoyed it. Moreover, a situation that is undoubtedly “aesthetic” for an art-centered aesthetician may not be perceived as such. For instance, some people do not, cannot, or refuse to interact aesthetically with a famous painting, while others can be totally indifferent independently of the musician performing a well-known piece of music (see, e.g., the Washington Post’s experiment with Joshua Bell). Moreover, the same agent can interact with the same “object” (or state of affairs) through different feelings. For example, someone who originally expected to spend a wonderful time as a tourist on an island may later start feeling that it was a bad idea to spend the rest of her life there. In all these cases of interaction the germ of “the aesthetic” is developed when subjective expectations are influenced by these feelings produced during the agent’s attempt to assign meaning and understand the implications that a situation would have for its goals. Undoubtedly, the list of such everyday interactive cases is endless, since a changing situation is a new opportunity for the agent to cope with by developing feelings of various intensities that influence the construction of the agent’s meanings and consequently the management of interactions.

        Excercise

How a journalist or a writer can influence the construction of agent’s meanings?

For naturalists such as Dewey and James, aesthetic perception, as any other type of perception, presupposes interaction. Dewey (1929) has very effectively argued that perception is an acknowledgment of unattained potentialities for interaction³. To perceive is to refer the current situation to consequences and to act accordingly. This means that perceivers are neither spectators nor passive recipients of information from the environment. Rather, they are cognitive agents that interact intentionally in their environments. Thus, naturalists deny the possibility of disinterested interactions. Perception is thus a predictive expectancy. For Dewey, the potential consequences of interaction are the sense that an object makes. This sense is a product of intellect and inference usually associated with an aesthetic intuition, where feeling, understanding, and action are one.

Excercise

Writings cannot inspire actions if feelings, understanding and action are not one. Discuss

As Dewey (1980; 15) has stated “In a world like ours, every living creature that attains sensibility welcomes order with a response of harmonious feeling whenever it finds a congruous order about it.” In other words, when the consequences of potential interaction are evaluated as promising (anticipating) order or disorder, their perception is aesthetic in nature. In all, aesthetic perception contributes to sense making⁴

Excercise

Writings make sense if they contain order and order about them so the perception of readers is aesthetic in nature. Discuss

These aesthetic evaluative outcomes are evoked through the emotions associated with the bodily and behavioral changes that occur during an interaction (Shusterman, 2013). Indeed, all relevant theoretical explanations and models, and all relevant experimental studies suggest that all activities that are eventually deemed aesthetic involve emotional processes of the same type and mode of realization as those that influence and prepare an agent to act (see, e.g., Chatterjee, 2011). The functional overlapping of processes related to aesthetic responses to works of art with those pertaining to emotional evaluation in any adaptive perception suggests that “the aesthetic” does not pre-exist (at least not in the object itself), but on the contrary it emerges in perception during interaction.

In accord with Rolls (2011), we claim that such emotional feelings could emerge in every interaction under the appropriate conditions, and they could be the origin of several types of aesthetic judgments. It should be noted that these feelings can only partially influence the agent’s actions or judgments in the given conditions. 

The common view says that aesthetic perception bears an objective part in its content, one that enables the categorization of some objects as aesthetic. Quite often in the literature, aesthetic objects are considered all those things that “carry a certain function”: to provoke an aesthetic form of response, to transmit information that evokes an aesthetic interest or experience (see, e.g., Ingarden, 1961; Walsh, 1974; Lind, 1980; Carroll, 1986; Bennett, 2002). However, there is an unclear assumption in this definition. Even though it is accepted that the object is subjectively evaluated in experience, authors do still believe there is somehow a kind of “objectivity” in perception. From this perspective, the object carries something special within its properties, some perceptual features, the communication of which could explicitly relate the object to aesthetic forms of response (see, e.g., Leder et al., 2004; Tilghman, 2004; Brandt, 2006; McManus et al., 2011). In this respect, aesthetic perception depends on the detection of “rightness,” the formalization of which is associated with an aesthetic property. Rightness and aesthetic properties may have positive or negative values. Their perception is determined by a “proper” organization of non-aesthetic features but cannot be reduced to them (see also Levinson, 2005, 2011).

Excercise

What are the non-aesthetic features and aesthetic properties of writings?

For instance, something is “garish” when it has a pattern of bright colors, but bright colors are not aesthetic per se; they are just pigments. They constitute “garish” only when they are applied “properly.” However, “garish” has usually a negative meaning, especially for those for whom bright colors are not their style. Notwithstanding this, the application of the “aesthetic in objects,” especially since the Bauhaus school, was nevertheless related to fixed norms or hardwired principles that guide designers and artists in formalizing their sense of rightness into aesthetic properties (Kim, 2006). This was for years a “safe” strategy to place the object in the category of “the aesthetic.” Following this mostly institutional strategy several scientific fields have attempted to objectify aesthetics. Taking into account the impact specific organizations of features may have in aesthetic perception (see, e.g., Silvera et al., 2002; Bar and Neta, 2006), several studies aim at measuring them, and objectifying their design by proposing them as aesthetic indexes (see, e.g., Jacobsen et al., 2006; de Tommaso et al., 2008). However, studies that test the validity of these general laws have not yielded satisfactory results with respect to the establishment of a general explanatory model of aesthetics (Leder et al., 2004). In general, empirical aesthetics, based on an art-centered tradition, has difficulty modeling and generalizing aesthetic guidelines even for simple interactive cases dealing with relatively simple forms of organization of features⁷. In addition, experimental findings indicate that what is considered as right is subjective and not always perceptible by everyone, since perceptual content is dynamically influenced by personal meanings and values (Locher, 2003) as well as by the context of interaction (Blijlevens et al., 2012). Moreover, experimental evidence suggests that aesthetic perception is mostly related to one’s idea of rightness as an optimal organization that cannot be reduced to a specific placement of features within that organization (Locher et al., 1999). The subjectivity in the communication of rightness is compatible with contemporary approaches to the “design process⁸.” The communication of rightness concerns both those who design an experience through a medium (design, artwork, etc.), and those who are engaged in an experience through this medium (Arnellos et al., 2010a). Designers seek to formalize their own idea of rightness into a designed medium by choosing out of unlimited possibilities those that are anticipated to engage perceivers and provide an optimal interaction (Xenakis and Arnellos, 2012). Perceivers should similarly detect the designer’s idea of rightness in these mediums or to perceive their own rightness. The latter may correspond to personal optimal ways of interaction that hardly coincide with a designer’s ideas. Moreover, an understanding of aesthetics, focusing on the perception of specific properties that constitute rightness does not explain the content of aesthetic perception. Especially when perceivers cannot see the designer’s idea of rightness, they see their own rightness or they do not care about rightness (Frohlich, 2004). Hence, if we accept the idea that something “transforms” an organization of non-aesthetic features to aesthetic properties it seems that this transformation is not due to the object itself but rather due to perceptual processes realized in a context whose characteristics and properties are still in question.

Excercise

How you explain the reasons for rejection of writings in west considered to be good in East.

Kantian disinterestedness (Kant, 2000) provides a possible explanation to this “special” context within which an agent perceives something aesthetically or not. According to Kant, emotions of pleasure and pain involved in aesthetic perception are unintentional (free from any kind of desire, aim, or purpose, or any social, moral, or intellectual considerations), in contrast to intentional reasonable thoughts involved in non-aesthetic perception. Influenced by the above difference, several authors approach “the aesthetic” as a property that has a vague relationship, or no relationship at all, to more pragmatic features that are associated with an object’s perceived usability, functionality, and instrumentality⁹ (see, e.g., Brandt, 2006; Hassenzahl, 2008; Moshagen and Thielsch, 2010). While objectives of utility and functionality are always designed and perceived intentionally (Crilly et al., 2009), the design and perception of “the aesthetic” lack such characteristics. Traditionally, in the design process “aesthetic phenomena seem apparently useless” as their perception emerges unintentionally during interaction (Hekkert, 2006, p. 161; see also Hekkert and Leder, 2007). This argument is quite radical, if not simply untenable, when seen in a naturalized context. Nevertheless, it still does not devoid “the aesthetic” from its normative dimension. Normativity plays a fundamental role in sense making and more generally in the characterization of agency in living systems (Barandiaran and Moreno, 2008; Burge, 2009; Arnellos et al., 2010b; see Christensen, 2012 

 “Aesthetic Perception in the Context of Interactivism and Embodied Cognition,” agents use their emotions normatively and produce meaning from their environment, even when these agents apparently remain inactive or seem to have no relation with their physical and social environments (Damasio, 1995). Moreover, it is now accepted among emotional theorists that emotions are not elicited in isolation and that they play an important role in sense making, even though agents may not be fully aware of those processes (see, e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Rolls, 2011). In addition, several studies have shown an unexpected correlation between aesthetics and instrumentality during the overall experience with objects (see, e.g., Tractinsky et al., 2000).

Returning to our initial inquiry concerning the possibility that aesthetic perception bears an objective part in its content, one which is intrinsically related to features, we could conclude that it is naïve to think that “the aesthetic” is pre-given to perception as a ready-made element reduced to specific organizations of features (Mitias, 1982). On the contrary, other aestheticians who aim at specifying the context in which one perceives an organization of non-aesthetic features as aesthetic properties argue in favor of an anticipatory content of an object.

God is the source of moral obligation. ... Such moral power is not available to human beings, because only God has such moral authority by virtue of the divinenature. Elsewhere, Quinn (1979) considers a different relationship between divine commands and moral obligations. 

Divine Command Theory

Philosophers both past and present have sought to defend theories of ethics that are grounded in a theistic framework. Roughly, Divine Command Theory is the view that morality is somehow dependent upon God, and that moral obligation consists in obedience to God’s commands. Divine Command Theory includes the claim that morality is ultimately based on the commands or character of God, and that the morally right action is the one that God commands or requires. The specific content of these divine commands varies according to the particular religion and the particular views of the individual divine command theorist, but all versions of the theory hold in common the claim that morality and moral obligations ultimately depend on God.

Divine Command Theory has been and continues to be highly controversial. It has been criticized by numerous philosophers, including Plato, Kai Nielsen, and J. L. Mackie. The theory also has many defenders, both classic and contemporary, such as Thomas Aquinas, Robert Adams, and Philip Quinn. The question of the possible connections between religion and ethics is of interest to moral philosophers as well as philosophers of religion, but it also leads us to consider the role of religion in society as well as the nature of moral deliberation. Given this, the arguments offered for and against Divine Command Theory have both theoretical and practical importance.

1. Modern Moral Philosophy

In her influential paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) argues that moral terms such as “should” and “ought” acquired a legalistic sense (that is, being bound by law) because of Christianity’s far-reaching historical influence and its legalistic conception of ethics. For example, use of the term “ought” seems to suggest a verdict on an action, and this in turn suggests a judge. On a law conception of ethics, conformity with the virtues requires obeying the divine law. A divine law requires the existence of God, as the divine lawgiver. Anscombe claims that since we have given up on God’s existence, we should also give up the use of moral terms that are derived from a theistic worldview. Since we have given up belief in God, we should also give up the moral understanding that rests on such belief, and engage in moral philosophy without using such terms. For Anscombe, this meant that we should abandon talk of morality as law, and instead focus on morality as virtue.

Alan Donagan (1977) argues against these conclusions. Donagan’s view is that Anscombe was mistaken on two counts. First, he rejects her claim that we can only treat morality as a system of law if we also presuppose the existence of a divine lawgiver. Second, Donagan contends that neither must we abandon law-based conceptions of morality for an Aristotelian virtue ethic. The reason for this, according to Donagan, is that a divine command must express God’s reason in order for it to be expressive of a divine law. Given this, if we assume that human reason is at least in principle adequate for directing our lives, then the substance of divine law that is relevant to human life can be appreciated with human reason, apart from any reference to a divine being. Moreover, according to Donagan, even if we conceive of morality as Aristotle did, namely, as a matter of virtue, it is quite natural to think that each virtue has as its counterpart some moral rule or precept. For example, ‘to act in manner x is to be just’ has as its counterpart ‘to act in manner x is morally right’. And if we can apprehend the relevant moral virtue via human reason, then we can also apprehend the relevant moral law by that same reason. Given the foregoing points raised by Anscombe and Donagan, a divine command theorist might opt for a conception of morality as virtue, as law, or both.

Before looking at some possible advantages of Divine Command Theory, it will be helpful to clarify further the content of the view. Edward Wierenga (1989) points out that there are many ways to conceive of the connection between God and morality. A strong version of Divine Command Theory includes the claim that moral statements (x is obligatory) are defined in terms of theological statements (x is commanded by God). At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the commands of God are coextensive with the demands of morality. God’s commands do not determine morality, but rather inform us about its content. Wierenga opts for a view that lies between these strong and weak versions of Divine Command Theory. In what follows, I will, following Wierenga, take Divine Command Theory to include the following claims: (i) God in some sense determines what is moral; (ii) moral obligations are derived from God’s commands, where these commands are understood as statements of the revealed divine will.

Extending over the same area, extent, or time.

"The control of conscious attention is not at all coextensive with information processing"

Exercise:

Would you follow theistic worldview or Alan Donagan arguments as a journalist?

Some Possible Advantages of Divine Command Theory

In his Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant, who has traditionally not been seen as an advocate of Divine Command Theory (for an opposing view see Nuyen, 1998), claims that morality requires faith in God and an afterlife. According to Kant, we must believe that God exists because the requirements of morality are too much for us to bear. We must believe that there is a God who will help us satisfy the demands of the moral law. With such a belief, we have the hope that we will be able to live moral lives. Moreover, Kant argues that “there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and proportionate happiness of a being who belongs to the world as one of its parts and is thus dependent on it” (p. 131). However, if there is a God and an afterlife where the righteous are rewarded with happiness and justice obtains, this problem goes away. That is, being moral does not guarantee happiness, so we must believe in a God who will reward the morally righteous with happiness. Kant does not employ the concept of moral faith as an argument for Divine Command Theory, but a contemporary advocate could argue along Kantian lines that these advantages do accrue to this view of morality.

Another possible advantage of Divine Command Theory is that it provides an objective metaphysical foundation for morality. For those committed to the existence of objective moral truths, such truths seem to fit well within a theistic framework. That is, if the origin of the universe is a personal moral being, then the existence of objective moral truths are at home, so to speak, in the universe. By contrast, if the origin of the universe is non-moral, then the existence of such truths becomes philosophically perplexing, because it is unclear how moral properties can come into existence via non-moral origins. Given the metaphysical insight that ex nihilo, nihilo fit, the resulting claim is that out of the non-moral, nothing moral comes. Objective moral properties stick out due to a lack of naturalness of fit in an entirely naturalistic universe. This perspective assumes that objective moral properties exist, which is of course highly controversial.

Not only does Divine Command Theory provide a metaphysical basis for morality, but according to many it also gives us a good answer to the question, why be moral? William Lane Craig argues that this is an advantage of a view of ethics that is grounded in God. On theism, we are held accountable for our actions by God. Those who do evil will be punished, and those who live morally upstanding lives will be vindicated and even rewarded. Good, in the end, triumphs over evil. Justice will win out. Moreover, on a theistic view of ethics, we have a reason to act in ways that run counter to our self-interest, because such actions of self-sacrifice have deep significance and merit within a theistic framework. On Divine Command Theory it is therefore rational to sacrifice my own well-being for the well-being of my children, my friends, and even complete strangers, because God approves of and even commands such acts of self-sacrifice.